In 1960, Richard Neustadt penned the seminal study of the American Presidency: Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents.
The book really lay the cornerstone for the behavioral revolution in
presidential studies and political scientists still assign the book to
undergraduate students. In fact, I'm teaching it right now and
re-reading portions as I prepare for class discussion today.
And, as I do my prep, I wonder how useful the book is today in an era of polarized political parties.
Neustadt's
main argument is that, in a government with separate institutions
sharing powers, the chief power of the president is the power to
persuade. He claims that if the president has to resort to his formal
powers to achieve his objectives, he's already failed and is likely to
pay a high price that will further undermine his persuasive capital in
future endeavors. To be effective, a president must husband his prestige
among the Washington elite and convince other political players that
their interests are aligned with the presidents.
Fundamentally,
the political landscape has changed tremendously since Neustadt wrote
the book. As well-documented elsewhere, the 1960s was an unusual moment
in political time when the parties were relatively heterogeneous
ideologically and members of Congress represented diverse and
competitive congressional districts. Presidents could effectively
marshal public opinion with the bully pulpit because the pulpit that
mattered was the Washington press corps, and there were only a few
television networks to command the attention of the American people.
Oh, how the times have changed.
The
media elite no longer have the sway or swagger they once did.
Traditional media empires are struggling to stay alive. As fewer people
read them, newspapers are folding and consolidating. People are
increasingly aligning their political beliefs with the blogs they read
and the newspapers they subscribe to. And members of Congress are less
trapped in the bubble of the Washington establishment than ever. They
spend more than half the time at home in their congressional districts,
and very rarely mingle across party lines. Members of Congress depend
even less on the president to win elections and hold their seats. In
ideologically polarized districts, the elections that matter are
primaries and not the generals; giving into a president and compromising
draws grumbles from the party base and ever more successful primary
challengers who are ever more extreme. Just ask Dick Lugar and Bob
Bennett the price of appearing too willing to go along with the other
party. Here in Montana, Republican Steve Daines has received his fair
share of gripes from members of his own party when he voted to re-open
government. One candidate, Champ Edmunds, is reconsidering his decision
to switch to the House race and may opt to challenge Daines in the
primary once Daines makes his widely anticipated Senate campaign
official.
Neustadt wrote that "the essence of a
President's persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to
induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own
appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their
interest, not his" (p. 40). That might have been possible in 1960. But
in 2013? A nigh impossible task. Consider the healthcare debate and
debacle. Not a single Republican member of Congress voted for the
Affordable Care Act. In fact, Republicans want to actively repeal the
law and, as I read this morning in the National Journal,
Republican legislators have placed numerous obstacles in states with
the express objective to make the law unworkable. How can the president
exercise persuasion when the objectives of the two parties is at
cross-purposes?
And the President is not blameless.
Although a grand show was made to appear inclusive during the
development of ACA, the president knew--ultimately--that he had enough
votes in both chambers to push through legislation without Republican
involvement and input. In fact, the final piece of ACA was implemented
using fast track reconciliation procedures--to the dismay of many
Republican legislators.
How can the president--or
anyone--be persuasive in an environment when the bargaining tool kit has
been left bare? The president has no electoral mandate--he won
reelection in a tight contest. The president has no congressional
coattails. The president can't campaign in congressional districts where
a Republican member of Congress is cross-pressured--hardly any exist.
The president can't even campaign in districts where Democrats are
moderate or conservative because that might endanger their reelection.
The president can't lubricate the legislative process with
earmarks--those have become toxic in this political environment and have
been eliminated in the House. The president can't marshal the public's
attention in a fragmented, narrowcasted media environment. Worse,
neither side can attend even to the simplest functions of government without using the opportunity
to gain political leverage. The debt crisis and government shutdown are a
case in point. No bargaining occurred and that was never the point. It
was about bludgeoning each side into submission while satisfying the
base of each party to raise campaign cash. No wonder no one escaped
unscathed from the sorry escapade.
Neustadt is
right on one point. When the president fails to persuade and relies on
his formal powers, he admits failure and pays a hefty political price.
The problem is the failure to persuade is not the president's failure
alone today. It is a failure of the political system which has, for all
intents and purposes, made it impossible for institutions sharing power
to bargain. Instead, we have institutions hording power. The result is
dysfunction and an increasingly frustrated American public. Will that
frustration lead to some grand swell up from the masses for political
change? We can only hope, but that hope belies political realities.
Showing posts with label Barack Obama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Barack Obama. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
The Public Debt Limit, Part II
It would appear congressional Republicans and the Obama Administration are getting nowhere in their budget talks despite the looming August 2nd deadline. If the two sides cannot agree by then, the United States will be in default on its loans. Who knows what would happen next? Most economists agree nothing pretty.
In light of these difficulties, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell floats a third option: let's give the president the power to increase the public debt limit himself. Here's a video of McConnell discussing the plan:
The McConnell option nicely ties my last two posts together (see here and here). Congress finds it difficult to make politically hard choices when the public is attentive and opinions are intensely held. Congress also finds it difficult to make tough choices when it's easy to pin the blame on individual members. Raising the public debt limit is an example of an issue where the public is attentive, opinions are intensely held on the issue, and blame can be easily pinned on members by those opposed to the actions of those members. Hence, Congress--as Anthony King describes it--"runs scared" and either avoids the issue or finds away to punt the problem to someone else.
As the Crossroads GPS ad makes it clear, Republicans and vulnerable Democrats will be loathe to vote to increase the public debt limit. It is all to easy to craft a commercial and blame the member for increasing the nation's debt. Both Republicans and Democrats have attentive publics to worry about: The Republicans the Tea Party, and Democrats their base (those who receive many of the entitlements that would be cut in any deal). The end result is congressional leaders finding it difficult to cut a deal because members are not willing to put their careers on the line for one vote. To illustrate the point, when Congresswoman Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA) cast the deciding vote for President Clinton's budget (which raised taxes on the middle class, despite Clinton's campaign promise) in 1993, Republicans were heard chanting: "Nah, Nah, Nah. Nah, Nah, Nah. Hey, Hey, Goodbye." And Congresswoman Margolies-Mezvinsky--who represented a Republican district and promised to not raise taxes on the middle class--lost in the 1994 Republican tidal wave. Voting against constituents on issues that are highly visible is not something members of Congress are eager to do.
Into the stalemate comes the McConnell option. Let's give the power to the president. Very simply put, this eliminates the traceability chain for members now and into the future and provides a solution to the current crisis. When Congress couldn't close military bases, they created a commission. When Congress couldn't develop a timely budget, they gave the power to the president. And when Congress realized that parochial interests undermined the nation's interest in trade policy (see the Smoot Hawley Tariff), they gave the president increasing power to negotiate trade agreements and Fast Track Trade Authority.
Congress has a long history of being unable to overcome the collective action problem, and their solution has been to increasingly give power to the executive branch. Given the flood of special interest money into the campaign process and the rise of what Jonathan Rauch calls hyperpluralism--both of which make it more difficult to make those hard choices and to govern--I suspect the powers of the executive branch will continue to increase at the expense of legislative branch. And I think both the left and the right can agree that this is not a good thing and certainly not what the Founding Fathers intended.
In light of these difficulties, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell floats a third option: let's give the president the power to increase the public debt limit himself. Here's a video of McConnell discussing the plan:
The McConnell option nicely ties my last two posts together (see here and here). Congress finds it difficult to make politically hard choices when the public is attentive and opinions are intensely held. Congress also finds it difficult to make tough choices when it's easy to pin the blame on individual members. Raising the public debt limit is an example of an issue where the public is attentive, opinions are intensely held on the issue, and blame can be easily pinned on members by those opposed to the actions of those members. Hence, Congress--as Anthony King describes it--"runs scared" and either avoids the issue or finds away to punt the problem to someone else.
As the Crossroads GPS ad makes it clear, Republicans and vulnerable Democrats will be loathe to vote to increase the public debt limit. It is all to easy to craft a commercial and blame the member for increasing the nation's debt. Both Republicans and Democrats have attentive publics to worry about: The Republicans the Tea Party, and Democrats their base (those who receive many of the entitlements that would be cut in any deal). The end result is congressional leaders finding it difficult to cut a deal because members are not willing to put their careers on the line for one vote. To illustrate the point, when Congresswoman Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA) cast the deciding vote for President Clinton's budget (which raised taxes on the middle class, despite Clinton's campaign promise) in 1993, Republicans were heard chanting: "Nah, Nah, Nah. Nah, Nah, Nah. Hey, Hey, Goodbye." And Congresswoman Margolies-Mezvinsky--who represented a Republican district and promised to not raise taxes on the middle class--lost in the 1994 Republican tidal wave. Voting against constituents on issues that are highly visible is not something members of Congress are eager to do.
Into the stalemate comes the McConnell option. Let's give the power to the president. Very simply put, this eliminates the traceability chain for members now and into the future and provides a solution to the current crisis. When Congress couldn't close military bases, they created a commission. When Congress couldn't develop a timely budget, they gave the power to the president. And when Congress realized that parochial interests undermined the nation's interest in trade policy (see the Smoot Hawley Tariff), they gave the president increasing power to negotiate trade agreements and Fast Track Trade Authority.
Congress has a long history of being unable to overcome the collective action problem, and their solution has been to increasingly give power to the executive branch. Given the flood of special interest money into the campaign process and the rise of what Jonathan Rauch calls hyperpluralism--both of which make it more difficult to make those hard choices and to govern--I suspect the powers of the executive branch will continue to increase at the expense of legislative branch. And I think both the left and the right can agree that this is not a good thing and certainly not what the Founding Fathers intended.
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Divided Government Matters
From Politico:

An analysis of investigations with the committee as the unit of analysis shows a similar trend: divided government is associate with more and longer investigations of the executive branch.
Is this a good thing? Not necessarily. As Matt and I conclude in a related article in progress:
"Our findings, however, do not suggest that a 'mended' Congress performing vigorous oversight is necessarily a positive development. Cartel committees in divided government pursue investigations aggressively and intensely, yes, but such activity may only serve to increase partisan rancor in Washington given such investigations are potentially driven by partisan purposes. More investigation need not imply better government. Indeed, given all the consternation expressed by some politicians and the public at large about pork barrel spending, our findings on investigation should give pause. Yes, Congress may be more willing to investigate the executive branch under divided government; however, it will not disturb the logrolling arrangements so important to the re-election prospects of individual members."
Which is why, of course, oversight was so lax when it concerned MMS.
The punch line: Divided government matters. It makes it harder to pass legislation, and increases the propensity of Congress to oversee the executive branch.
"California Rep. Darrell Issa is already eyeing a massive expansion of oversight for next year, including hundreds of hearings; creating new subcommittees; and launching fresh investigations into the bank bailout, the stimulus and, potentially, health care reform.
Issa told POLITICO in an interview that he wants each of his seven subcommittees to hold “one or two hearings each week.”"
Issa told POLITICO in an interview that he wants each of his seven subcommittees to hold “one or two hearings each week.”"
David Mayhew wrote a book called Divided We Govern in 1991. In that book, he argues that Divided Government does not lead to more high profile investigations of the executive branch. My co-author Matt Dull and I took on this assertation in an article ("Divided We Quarrel") published last year in Legislative Studies Quarterly, where we find that divided government is significantly associated with an increase in the number and intensity of investigations of executive branch malfeasance conducted by the House of Representatives. Although our analysis ends in 2004, data we have collected for the 110th Congress show a spike in investigations with the return of divided government.
Here is Figure 2 from that article:
An analysis of investigations with the committee as the unit of analysis shows a similar trend: divided government is associate with more and longer investigations of the executive branch.
Is this a good thing? Not necessarily. As Matt and I conclude in a related article in progress:
"Our findings, however, do not suggest that a 'mended' Congress performing vigorous oversight is necessarily a positive development. Cartel committees in divided government pursue investigations aggressively and intensely, yes, but such activity may only serve to increase partisan rancor in Washington given such investigations are potentially driven by partisan purposes. More investigation need not imply better government. Indeed, given all the consternation expressed by some politicians and the public at large about pork barrel spending, our findings on investigation should give pause. Yes, Congress may be more willing to investigate the executive branch under divided government; however, it will not disturb the logrolling arrangements so important to the re-election prospects of individual members."
Which is why, of course, oversight was so lax when it concerned MMS.
The punch line: Divided government matters. It makes it harder to pass legislation, and increases the propensity of Congress to oversee the executive branch.
Monday, November 1, 2010
Why it is increasingly difficult to succeed as President
From Ross Douthat in today's New York Times:
At the same time, their legislative maneuverings — the buy-offs and back-room deals, the inevitable coziness with lobbyists — exposed the weakness of modern liberal governance: it tends to be stymied and corrupted by the very welfare state that it’s seeking to expand. Many ofBarack Obama ’s supporters expected him to be another Franklin Roosevelt, energetically experimenting with one program after another. But Roosevelt didn’t have to cope with the web of interest groups that’s gradually woven itself around the government his New Deal helped build. And while Obama twisted in these webs, the public gradually decided that it liked bigger government more in theory than in practice.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/opinion/01douthat.html?ref=todayspaper
This illustrates nicely the concept of historical time. In his book, The Politics Presidents Make, discusses how the progression of historical time makes it difficult for succeeding presidents, regardless of their place in political time, to accomplish their agenda. Douthat's point, essentially, is that institutional thickening--the rise of interest groups with their own agendas--make it nearly impossible to nimbly reshape government.
The larger point is that political time itself may becoming increasingly irrelevant. As Skowronek notes, increasing institutional thickening will make it increasingly difficult for all presidents--regardless of their place in the regime or their warrants for action--to succeed. The only way for them to do so is to constantly seek third way solutions--to triangulate. The good news is presidents can still be successful. The bad news is it becomes increasingly difficult to establish an enduring legacy and institute a new, longstanding regime.
For Obama to succeed in gridlocked government, he's going to have to learn the lessons of preemption fromBill Clinton and Richard Nixon . He should play the left and the right off of each other, and strive to find middle-of-the road solutions in the next two years.
At the same time, their legislative maneuverings — the buy-offs and back-room deals, the inevitable coziness with lobbyists — exposed the weakness of modern liberal governance: it tends to be stymied and corrupted by the very welfare state that it’s seeking to expand. Many of
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/opinion/01douthat.html?ref=todayspaper
This illustrates nicely the concept of historical time. In his book, The Politics Presidents Make, discusses how the progression of historical time makes it difficult for succeeding presidents, regardless of their place in political time, to accomplish their agenda. Douthat's point, essentially, is that institutional thickening--the rise of interest groups with their own agendas--make it nearly impossible to nimbly reshape government.
The larger point is that political time itself may becoming increasingly irrelevant. As Skowronek notes, increasing institutional thickening will make it increasingly difficult for all presidents--regardless of their place in the regime or their warrants for action--to succeed. The only way for them to do so is to constantly seek third way solutions--to triangulate. The good news is presidents can still be successful. The bad news is it becomes increasingly difficult to establish an enduring legacy and institute a new, longstanding regime.
For Obama to succeed in gridlocked government, he's going to have to learn the lessons of preemption from
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Obama: Proving to be Pre-Emptive
Further evidence that Obama is a pre-emptive--not a reconstructive--president:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29388258/
Obama's speech very much drew upon both New Deal and Reagan political traditions. Government is a solution, but it has its limits. Obama's presidency will not shatter the old order or establish a new, longstanding political coalition.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29388258/
Obama's speech very much drew upon both New Deal and Reagan political traditions. Government is a solution, but it has its limits. Obama's presidency will not shatter the old order or establish a new, longstanding political coalition.
Monday, February 9, 2009
Obama's first news conference

Sat down tonight to watch Obama's first news conference. I was impressed with the give and take, and learned a lot.
I remarked to my wife that it was nice to have a president who wasn't afraid of the facing the media in a news conference, thinking that Bush was loathe to do this. Well, turns out he wasn't as loathe to do a news conference than I had thought.
According to the American Presidency Project at UC-Santa Barbara, Bush held a total of 209 news conferences during his presidency, averaging just a shade more than 26. In 2008-09, Bush 29 news conferences alone.
While much fewer than Presidents Coolidge through Truman, Bush fares well compared to his contemporaries. He held more on year, on average, than Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton. Only his father exceeded the yearly average, holding more news conferences on average than any president since Truman.
Boy, was I wrong! And it just goes to show you that sometimes an impression fostered by the media (Bush as syntactically challenged and afraid of facing the media in unscripted events) can lead to the wrong conclusions about a president/presidency. Check out all the nifty graphs and charts at the website.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Obama's stimulus passes...
without any GOP votes in the House.
Why?
Simple: the Republicans left in the House represent heavily Republican districts. Nearly every Republican representing a marginal House district lost in either 2006 or 2008.
Therefore, voting against the stimulus was the right vote. Voting for it can open up these House members to a primary challenge--virtually the only way they could lose their seats.
Expect more defections among Republicans in the Senate, given the nature of their more heterogenous constituencies.
Why?
Simple: the Republicans left in the House represent heavily Republican districts. Nearly every Republican representing a marginal House district lost in either 2006 or 2008.
Therefore, voting against the stimulus was the right vote. Voting for it can open up these House members to a primary challenge--virtually the only way they could lose their seats.
Expect more defections among Republicans in the Senate, given the nature of their more heterogenous constituencies.
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Obama's speech
Very interesting. Some commentary felt that it wasn't as impressive as the event itself, with all the crowds shouting for Obama and the intensely felt passion of the onlookers.
I disagree. First, Obama had a number of things he had to do. First, inspire confidence. Second, tell the hard truth about the tough economic circumstances we're in. Third, strike a clear chord with foreign nations about the intent of the nation internationally from this moment forward.
I thought he did all three, and did them well.
And, if you listened carefully, there were shades of Reagan, JFK, and FDR.
JFK--all call to service.
Reagan--candor about economic problems and an acknowledgment that while tough, Americans can get through this.
FDR--shaming the money lenders.
What was different, strikingly to this listener, was Obama's solution. Reagan, of course, felt that the economic ills were afflicted by government and that government was not the solution. FDR blamed Wall Street. Obama--well, he tried to craft a new path. Government is not always the solution, but it is not always the devil, either. It was interesting that he said we'll do what works and scrap what doesn't--very technocratic, and very Jimmy Carter. Pragmatism was the solution that was being peddled.
The question is, of course, if Obama can be the reconstructive president that Reagan and FDR were. If he can make good on his promise to change the tone in Washington, to get us to grow up, as it were, then perhaps. But the solution that is neither anti- nor pro-governmental strikes me as very Clinton and very pre-emptive. These presidents are successful in their own right, but do not establish long lasting legacies.
I'll keep watching and listening.
I disagree. First, Obama had a number of things he had to do. First, inspire confidence. Second, tell the hard truth about the tough economic circumstances we're in. Third, strike a clear chord with foreign nations about the intent of the nation internationally from this moment forward.
I thought he did all three, and did them well.
And, if you listened carefully, there were shades of Reagan, JFK, and FDR.
JFK--all call to service.
Reagan--candor about economic problems and an acknowledgment that while tough, Americans can get through this.
FDR--shaming the money lenders.
What was different, strikingly to this listener, was Obama's solution. Reagan, of course, felt that the economic ills were afflicted by government and that government was not the solution. FDR blamed Wall Street. Obama--well, he tried to craft a new path. Government is not always the solution, but it is not always the devil, either. It was interesting that he said we'll do what works and scrap what doesn't--very technocratic, and very Jimmy Carter. Pragmatism was the solution that was being peddled.
The question is, of course, if Obama can be the reconstructive president that Reagan and FDR were. If he can make good on his promise to change the tone in Washington, to get us to grow up, as it were, then perhaps. But the solution that is neither anti- nor pro-governmental strikes me as very Clinton and very pre-emptive. These presidents are successful in their own right, but do not establish long lasting legacies.
I'll keep watching and listening.
Monday, November 10, 2008
Nebraska: 4 to 1
The person who wins the most votes in each state during the presidential campaign gets all the electoral votes, right?
Wrong.
That's true for 48 of the states where the electoral college vote is winner take all. Maine and Nebraska, however, do it differently. In each case, the state awards two of its votes to the winner of the state popular vote total. The other votes are apportioned to the winner of the popular vote in each congressional district.
In November, Nebraska for the first time split its electoral college vote. Nebraska is a very Republican state and McCain swamped Obama overall, winning two of state's electoral college votes. He also beat Obama in the Third Congressional District (most of the state west of Lincoln) and the First Congressional District (including the area around Lincoln and roughly the eastern third). Obama, however, beat McCain in the popular vote in the 2nd Congressional District, which is essentially Omaha.
So, Obama gets 1 electoral college vote from Nebraska, and McCain gets 4.
Odds are the Republican-controlled legislature (which is nonpartisan, but not really) will change the law so this doesn't happen again...
I've been recovering from the election. Expect more posts about the election, Obama's administration, and other current events soon.
Wrong.
That's true for 48 of the states where the electoral college vote is winner take all. Maine and Nebraska, however, do it differently. In each case, the state awards two of its votes to the winner of the state popular vote total. The other votes are apportioned to the winner of the popular vote in each congressional district.
In November, Nebraska for the first time split its electoral college vote. Nebraska is a very Republican state and McCain swamped Obama overall, winning two of state's electoral college votes. He also beat Obama in the Third Congressional District (most of the state west of Lincoln) and the First Congressional District (including the area around Lincoln and roughly the eastern third). Obama, however, beat McCain in the popular vote in the 2nd Congressional District, which is essentially Omaha.
So, Obama gets 1 electoral college vote from Nebraska, and McCain gets 4.
Odds are the Republican-controlled legislature (which is nonpartisan, but not really) will change the law so this doesn't happen again...
I've been recovering from the election. Expect more posts about the election, Obama's administration, and other current events soon.
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
What the Election Means to my students
Last night was an historic election to be sure. Rather than give my thoughts about what happened, I thought it best to ask my students to reflect carefully on what November 4th, 2008 meant to them. I asked them to watch both Barack Obama's victory speech in Grant Park, and John McCain's concession in Phoenix, and then carefully reflect upon the last 20 months of campaigning. Attached to this, in comment form, are their thoughts. After they have their say, I'll try to add some of my own reactions.
Now, without further ado, the students who were part of that 18 percent.
Now, without further ado, the students who were part of that 18 percent.
Sunday, November 2, 2008
Reverse Bradley Effect and Undecided Voters
Charles Franklin, who taught me statistics at the University of Wisconsin, has a great post addressing the so-called Bradley Effect and undecided voters. Read it here.
Franklin uses empirical data to suggest that the Bradley Effect, if it exists at all, will have a marginal effect in the aggregate. Second, he notes that it appears that undecided voters will break evenly for McCain and Obama.
There's been much speculation about both of these issues. Franklin's analysis actually looks at data to answer the question and is a great example of fine social science.
On the question of undecided voters, I've heard the following:
a) Undecided voters are likely to break for McCain, who is the known quantity.
b) Undecided voters are likely to break for Obama, because they want change.
c) Undecided voters are likely to not vote.
So, which is it?
Context matters in figuring out undecided voters. In the case of a presidential election, voters have enormous amounts of information available to them about both candidates. In this instance, it is hard to see--especially given the amount of money the Obama campaign has spent and McCain's long presence on the national scene--that an undecided voter does not have enough information to make a decision about Obama or McCain.
This is different from your run of the mill congressional election. For example, a congressional election generally features lots of information about the incumbent and relatively little about the challenger. Undecideds, in this situation, are likely to break for who they know best ABSENT mitigating factors. If, however, national events and the challenger's campaign have raised enough questions sufficient to put doubts in the minds of the voter about the incumbent, it is more likely that undecided voters will break for the challenger to express those doubts and concerns.
Undecided voters in a high information contest without an incumbent such as this year's presidential race are likely cross-pressured voters, to use the classic term from one of the earliest studies on voting behavior (Berelson et al 1954). In short, there are issues that pull them in both directions simultaneously. A good example might be a voter who is concerned about the economy and national security. Economically, perhaps they like Obama's plans better, but McCain's experience on defense matters pulls them in the opposite direction.
Franklin's data suggests that undecided voters will split their vote on Election Day between the two candidates. That is probably the case. But also important to remember is those who are cross-pressured face a difficult decision which is cognitively unpleasant. A portion of those voters are just as likely to stay at home than make the difficult choice.
To summarize, I do not anticipate McCain picking up undecideds by two to one, as his campaign suggests. If he does, then he's got a shot on Tuesday.
Franklin uses empirical data to suggest that the Bradley Effect, if it exists at all, will have a marginal effect in the aggregate. Second, he notes that it appears that undecided voters will break evenly for McCain and Obama.
There's been much speculation about both of these issues. Franklin's analysis actually looks at data to answer the question and is a great example of fine social science.
On the question of undecided voters, I've heard the following:
a) Undecided voters are likely to break for McCain, who is the known quantity.
b) Undecided voters are likely to break for Obama, because they want change.
c) Undecided voters are likely to not vote.
So, which is it?
Context matters in figuring out undecided voters. In the case of a presidential election, voters have enormous amounts of information available to them about both candidates. In this instance, it is hard to see--especially given the amount of money the Obama campaign has spent and McCain's long presence on the national scene--that an undecided voter does not have enough information to make a decision about Obama or McCain.
This is different from your run of the mill congressional election. For example, a congressional election generally features lots of information about the incumbent and relatively little about the challenger. Undecideds, in this situation, are likely to break for who they know best ABSENT mitigating factors. If, however, national events and the challenger's campaign have raised enough questions sufficient to put doubts in the minds of the voter about the incumbent, it is more likely that undecided voters will break for the challenger to express those doubts and concerns.
Undecided voters in a high information contest without an incumbent such as this year's presidential race are likely cross-pressured voters, to use the classic term from one of the earliest studies on voting behavior (Berelson et al 1954). In short, there are issues that pull them in both directions simultaneously. A good example might be a voter who is concerned about the economy and national security. Economically, perhaps they like Obama's plans better, but McCain's experience on defense matters pulls them in the opposite direction.
Franklin's data suggests that undecided voters will split their vote on Election Day between the two candidates. That is probably the case. But also important to remember is those who are cross-pressured face a difficult decision which is cognitively unpleasant. A portion of those voters are just as likely to stay at home than make the difficult choice.
To summarize, I do not anticipate McCain picking up undecideds by two to one, as his campaign suggests. If he does, then he's got a shot on Tuesday.
Thursday, October 23, 2008
You're not voting for McCain or Obama, technically
A few weeks ago, I was sitting in my office doing some work and I got a phone call from what I thought was a reporter. The person on the other end of the line asked me if it's true that we don't really vote for the candidates listed on the ballot. I replied that was correct. Technically, when we cast our ballots in the presidential election, we vote for electors that are pledged to that candidate.
The voice on the other end of the line asked me, "Well, then how do we know that they will vote for the person they are pledged to?"
My response: you don't, and that's the point. The Electoral College was set up as one last check against majority tyranny by the Founding Fathers. When we cast our ballots, we actually cast our ballots for a slate of electors who then cast their ballots for their presidential choice. And they can choose to express themselves however they wish, regardless of their individual pledge to a candidate. Each elector represents one of the state's electoral college votes. In Montana, then, we have three electors that will cast their ballots in December for president. Who wins the popular vote in the state will have the three electors pledged to them cast Montana's electoral votes. This vote total is received by the Secretary of the Senate and that becomes the official election tally.
In case you were wondering, here are the electors pledged to McCain and Obama:

1. Thelma Baker
2. Errol Gault
3. John Brenden

1. Chas Jankier
2. Ann Milbrooke
3. Greg Jerguson
The likelihood of an elector NOT casting their ballot for the candidate to whom they are pledged is quite rare. First, the electors are generally good party members and friends of the candidate. Second, some states have laws that require electors to cast their ballots for the candidate who wins the popular vote in the state (of course, I think these laws are constitutionally dubious but, to my knowledge, they've never been challenged). Montana is one of these states. This suggests, of course, that the check on majority tyranny is no longer a check but a simply constitutional formality ratifying the will of the people.
The last time an elector did not cast their ballot as pledged was in 1976 when one of Gerald Ford's electors cast his ballot for Ronald Reagan.
By the way, the person who called me was not a journalist but a chef. He and his colleagues were simply discussing this while preparing for the lunch crowd, and wanted to know who Montana's electors were.
The voice on the other end of the line asked me, "Well, then how do we know that they will vote for the person they are pledged to?"
My response: you don't, and that's the point. The Electoral College was set up as one last check against majority tyranny by the Founding Fathers. When we cast our ballots, we actually cast our ballots for a slate of electors who then cast their ballots for their presidential choice. And they can choose to express themselves however they wish, regardless of their individual pledge to a candidate. Each elector represents one of the state's electoral college votes. In Montana, then, we have three electors that will cast their ballots in December for president. Who wins the popular vote in the state will have the three electors pledged to them cast Montana's electoral votes. This vote total is received by the Secretary of the Senate and that becomes the official election tally.
In case you were wondering, here are the electors pledged to McCain and Obama:

1. Thelma Baker
2. Errol Gault
3. John Brenden

1. Chas Jankier
2. Ann Milbrooke
3. Greg Jerguson
The likelihood of an elector NOT casting their ballot for the candidate to whom they are pledged is quite rare. First, the electors are generally good party members and friends of the candidate. Second, some states have laws that require electors to cast their ballots for the candidate who wins the popular vote in the state (of course, I think these laws are constitutionally dubious but, to my knowledge, they've never been challenged). Montana is one of these states. This suggests, of course, that the check on majority tyranny is no longer a check but a simply constitutional formality ratifying the will of the people.
The last time an elector did not cast their ballot as pledged was in 1976 when one of Gerald Ford's electors cast his ballot for Ronald Reagan.
By the way, the person who called me was not a journalist but a chef. He and his colleagues were simply discussing this while preparing for the lunch crowd, and wanted to know who Montana's electors were.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Presidential Debate, Part Deux
No debate party tonight, unfortunately. Here are some quick thoughts about the debate from my notes:
1. Obama had answers which elicited, more consistently, positive responses from the CNN focus group. In particular, he seemed to do well among women in the focus group.
2. McCain is much better at navigating the Town Hall format, physically. But Obama did a better job directly answering the questions.
3. Not much new. McCain's home mortgage policy plan was interesting, and might get him a bit back in the economic game. I do find it interesting, though, that everyone is so surprised that there ISN'T much new. To some extent, there shouldn't be. Messages should be well honed and repeated for people to get it. The reason why candidates buy SO many TV ads is it takes repeating a message several times before it sinks in. Teachers and advertisers know this. Journalists should, too.
4. The question I was most interested in was the sacrifice question. Good leaders steer Americans in a particular direction, and the best presidents ask for sacrifices in time of need. Obama's answer was better in this regard, while McCain went to his standard earmark answer. Obama talked about creating an ability to serve in a variety of capacities. He noted that young people hunger to make this country better, and he would provide the opportunities for them to do that. McCain, the person who found himself in service to his country, should have nailed this question. How each answered this question, I felt, said a lot about what they will expect of us. Obama got it right, McCain missed an opportunity.
5. McCain's answer on Russia was great. Balanced, carefully crafted, and smart.
6. Obama attacked McCain's healthcare plan by suggesting that insurance companies will move to the state with the fewest regulations and restrictions. This is the old race to the bottom versus the race to the top argument I talk about when we discuss federalism in my introductory classes. The problem is there is evidence for a race to the top and the bottom. California, in establishing state emissions standards, has effectively created higher national standards because it isn't cost effective for Detroit to make cars only to meet California's standards. So, I didn't buy Obama's argument here.
7.Obama's answer on healthcare, being a right, was great because it told the personal story of his mother--and it strikes a chord with other Americans who had to battle insurance companies instead of battling their illnesses.
8. Can I just say that I really don't like town hall style debates?
Who won? Obama did well in the town hall format, which is McCain's domain. I think both did well, but the edge goes to Obama.
1. Obama had answers which elicited, more consistently, positive responses from the CNN focus group. In particular, he seemed to do well among women in the focus group.
2. McCain is much better at navigating the Town Hall format, physically. But Obama did a better job directly answering the questions.
3. Not much new. McCain's home mortgage policy plan was interesting, and might get him a bit back in the economic game. I do find it interesting, though, that everyone is so surprised that there ISN'T much new. To some extent, there shouldn't be. Messages should be well honed and repeated for people to get it. The reason why candidates buy SO many TV ads is it takes repeating a message several times before it sinks in. Teachers and advertisers know this. Journalists should, too.
4. The question I was most interested in was the sacrifice question. Good leaders steer Americans in a particular direction, and the best presidents ask for sacrifices in time of need. Obama's answer was better in this regard, while McCain went to his standard earmark answer. Obama talked about creating an ability to serve in a variety of capacities. He noted that young people hunger to make this country better, and he would provide the opportunities for them to do that. McCain, the person who found himself in service to his country, should have nailed this question. How each answered this question, I felt, said a lot about what they will expect of us. Obama got it right, McCain missed an opportunity.
5. McCain's answer on Russia was great. Balanced, carefully crafted, and smart.
6. Obama attacked McCain's healthcare plan by suggesting that insurance companies will move to the state with the fewest regulations and restrictions. This is the old race to the bottom versus the race to the top argument I talk about when we discuss federalism in my introductory classes. The problem is there is evidence for a race to the top and the bottom. California, in establishing state emissions standards, has effectively created higher national standards because it isn't cost effective for Detroit to make cars only to meet California's standards. So, I didn't buy Obama's argument here.
7.Obama's answer on healthcare, being a right, was great because it told the personal story of his mother--and it strikes a chord with other Americans who had to battle insurance companies instead of battling their illnesses.
8. Can I just say that I really don't like town hall style debates?
Who won? Obama did well in the town hall format, which is McCain's domain. I think both did well, but the edge goes to Obama.
Monday, September 22, 2008
The Presidential Debates: Watch'm
The first presidential debate, on the campus of Ole Miss, will be held this Friday at 6PM MDT. Given that the political conventions this year drew the largest television audience in history, I suspect these events will be well-watched and will help many voters make up their minds.

To put the debates in perspective, here's a link to a great website with resources for all the past presidential debates.
The first televised presidential debate was in 1960 between JFK and Richard Nixon. Interestingly, people who heard the debate on the radio felt Nixon had won and those who watched the debates thought Kennedy had. The television audience was larger, and when you watch footage of the debate, it is easy to see why Kennedy was perceived as the victor: he looked confident, tanned, and attractive. Nixon, with his shifting eyes and four o'clock shadow showing through without the benefit of makeup, confirmed the suspicions many had of him. Fair or not, the image of JFK may have made the difference in one of America's closest presidential elections.
The key goal in a presidential debate is to at least meet expectations and not make any mistakes. Ford's claim that the Soviet Union did not dominate Poland probably hurt him in 1976. Reagan's performance in 1980 demonstrated that he wasn't the reactionary nut the Carter administration tried to paint him as, and George HW Bush's looking at his watch in 1992 during the town hall debate fed into the perception that he didn't understand the average person. And who can forget the first presidential debate in 2000: Al Gore's sighing, and Bush's inability to project confidence and policy knowledge.
Here's what I will be looking for on Friday:
Can McCain project energy to overcome the Obama's youthful image?
How will Obama deal with McCain's attacks?
Will McCain keep his temper in check?
Can Obama actually take the gloves off without coming off as mean (remember his snide remark to Hillary, "You're likeable enough?")
Can Obama articulate a vision of America and project an understanding of the average citizen?
Can McCain blunt Obama's advantage on the economy?
And, most importantly:
How many times will Obama mention the "McCain-Bush" team? And how many times will McCain mention Bush in return?

To put the debates in perspective, here's a link to a great website with resources for all the past presidential debates.
The first televised presidential debate was in 1960 between JFK and Richard Nixon. Interestingly, people who heard the debate on the radio felt Nixon had won and those who watched the debates thought Kennedy had. The television audience was larger, and when you watch footage of the debate, it is easy to see why Kennedy was perceived as the victor: he looked confident, tanned, and attractive. Nixon, with his shifting eyes and four o'clock shadow showing through without the benefit of makeup, confirmed the suspicions many had of him. Fair or not, the image of JFK may have made the difference in one of America's closest presidential elections.
The key goal in a presidential debate is to at least meet expectations and not make any mistakes. Ford's claim that the Soviet Union did not dominate Poland probably hurt him in 1976. Reagan's performance in 1980 demonstrated that he wasn't the reactionary nut the Carter administration tried to paint him as, and George HW Bush's looking at his watch in 1992 during the town hall debate fed into the perception that he didn't understand the average person. And who can forget the first presidential debate in 2000: Al Gore's sighing, and Bush's inability to project confidence and policy knowledge.
Here's what I will be looking for on Friday:
Can McCain project energy to overcome the Obama's youthful image?
How will Obama deal with McCain's attacks?
Will McCain keep his temper in check?
Can Obama actually take the gloves off without coming off as mean (remember his snide remark to Hillary, "You're likeable enough?")
Can Obama articulate a vision of America and project an understanding of the average citizen?
Can McCain blunt Obama's advantage on the economy?
And, most importantly:
How many times will Obama mention the "McCain-Bush" team? And how many times will McCain mention Bush in return?
Friday, September 5, 2008
Who's the maverick?

Obama says he will bring change and a new nonpartisanship to Washington. McCain says he's the original maverick, and has the experience to prove it. Biden says McCain voted with President Bush 95% of the time; he's no maverick. The Republicans say Barack has no record of acting bipartisan in Washington.
Who's right?
The problem with cherry-picking data is it feeds into the old adage that students so often like to cite: "You can make statistics say anything."
Biden's statistics are correct: in 2007, John McCain supported President Bush 95% when the president announced a stand on a Senate roll call vote. This is according to the presidential support scores calculated by Congressional Quarterly annually, and used by political scientists who study both institutions. Unfortunately, this does not necessary answer the question of whether McCain is a maverick or not. Some media accounts report that there were a lot of immigration votes that year. It just so happened that Bush and McCain agreed on immigration: the problem was, the rest of the party left them hanging dry. Presidential support scores are problematic because they take a small subset of Senate roll call votes and don't give a good sense of whether someone is willing to buck the party.
Instead, I recommend looking at the party unity score--also calculated by Congressional Quarterly. This score is defined as the percentage of the time the member of Congress voted with their party when 50 percent of the party voted one way and 50 percent of the other party voted the other way (or vice versa).
For example, a party unity vote has to have at least half the Republicans voting nay on an issue and half the Democrats voting yea to be considered in the analysis. This eliminates procedural votes and commemorative legislation that often passes with overwhelming partisan majorities. This gives us a better look at who is willing to buck the party on a number of issues, whether the president takes a stand or not.
Here's a chart of McCain's Party Unity Averages by Congressional session, beginning with the 100th Senate and ending with the 109th. Next to McCain's score, you'll see the Republican Senate average for that session:
Congress McCain GOP Average
100 88 77
101 84 78
102 88 83
103 91 84
104 91 91
105 84 87
106 87 90
107 71 86
108 84 92
109 81 89
Like many members of Congress, McCain voted more often with the party early his career began to become more independent the longer he served. Indeed, we begin to see this drift during the 105th Congress (1997-1998). Three times, McCain's party unity average is almost a full standard deviation below the Republican mean: in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses.
McCain is no Ralph Hall (who exhibited party unity scores in the 20s and 30s as a Democratic Representative from Texas in the House. He later switched parties and became a Republican). But he's clearly NOT the party unity poster boy Biden's comments make him out to be.
Now, what about Obama? Well, I only have data from the 109th Congress available to me. The Democratic party unity average in that session was 89 percent. Senator Obama's average was 96 percent. This suggests there is some truth to McCain's claim that he has the record of a maverick and Obama does not. Even Obama's running mate rated a 90 percent in the 109th Congress.
Now whether you knew McCain was a maverick from last night's speech, that's a different story.
Next time, I hope to do an analysis of pre-VP nomination experience to evaluate the claim that Palin has precious little experience compared to other past nominees.
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