The Power of the Presidency is the Power to Persuade--Really?

In 1960, Richard Neustadt penned the seminal study of the American Presidency: Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. The book really lay the cornerstone for the behavioral revolution in presidential studies and political scientists still assign the book to undergraduate students. In fact, I'm teaching it right now and re-reading portions as I prepare for class discussion today.

And, as I do my prep, I wonder how useful the book is today in an era of polarized political parties.

Neustadt's main argument is that, in a government with separate institutions sharing powers, the chief power of the president is the power to persuade. He claims that if the president has to resort to his formal powers to achieve his objectives, he's already failed and is likely to pay a high price that will further undermine his persuasive capital in future endeavors. To be effective, a president must husband his prestige among the Washington elite and convince other political players that their interests are aligned with the presidents.

Fundamentally, the political landscape has changed tremendously since Neustadt wrote the book. As well-documented elsewhere, the 1960s was an unusual moment in political time when the parties were relatively heterogeneous ideologically and members of Congress represented diverse and competitive congressional districts. Presidents could effectively marshal public opinion with the bully pulpit because the pulpit that mattered was the Washington press corps, and there were only a few television networks to command the attention of the American people.

Oh, how the times have changed.

The media elite no longer have the sway or swagger they once did. Traditional media empires are struggling to stay alive. As fewer people read them, newspapers are folding and consolidating. People are increasingly aligning their political beliefs with the blogs they read and the newspapers they subscribe to. And members of Congress are less trapped in the bubble of the Washington establishment than ever. They spend more than half the time at home in their congressional districts, and very rarely mingle across party lines. Members of Congress depend even less on the president to win elections and hold their seats. In ideologically polarized districts, the elections that matter are primaries and not the generals; giving into a president and compromising draws grumbles from the party base and ever more successful primary challengers who are ever more extreme. Just ask Dick Lugar and Bob Bennett the price of appearing too willing to go along with the other party. Here in Montana, Republican Steve Daines has received his fair share of gripes from members of his own party when he voted to re-open government. One candidate, Champ Edmunds, is reconsidering his decision to switch to the House race and may opt to challenge Daines in the primary once Daines makes his widely anticipated Senate campaign official.

Neustadt wrote that "the essence of a President's persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his" (p. 40). That might have been possible in 1960. But in 2013? A nigh impossible task. Consider the healthcare debate and debacle. Not a single Republican member of Congress voted for the Affordable Care Act. In fact, Republicans want to actively repeal the law and, as I read this morning in the National Journal, Republican legislators have placed numerous obstacles in states with the express objective to make the law unworkable. How can the president exercise persuasion  when the objectives of the two parties is at cross-purposes?

And the President is not blameless. Although a grand show was made to appear inclusive during the development of ACA, the president knew--ultimately--that he had enough votes in both chambers to push through legislation without Republican involvement and input. In fact, the final piece of ACA was implemented using fast track reconciliation procedures--to the dismay of many Republican legislators.

How can the president--or anyone--be persuasive in an environment when the bargaining tool kit has been left bare? The president has no electoral mandate--he won reelection in a tight contest. The president has no congressional coattails. The president can't campaign in congressional districts where a Republican member of Congress is cross-pressured--hardly any exist. The president can't even campaign in districts where Democrats are moderate or conservative because that might endanger their reelection. The president can't lubricate the legislative process with earmarks--those have become toxic in this political environment and have been eliminated in the House. The president can't marshal the public's attention in a fragmented, narrowcasted media environment. Worse, neither side can attend even to the simplest  functions of government without using the opportunity to gain political leverage. The debt crisis and government shutdown are a case in point. No bargaining occurred and that was never the point. It was about bludgeoning each side into submission while satisfying the base of each party to raise campaign cash. No wonder no one escaped unscathed from the sorry escapade.

Neustadt is right on one point. When the president fails to persuade and relies on his formal powers, he admits failure and pays a hefty political price. The problem is the failure to persuade is not the president's failure alone today. It is a failure of the political system which has, for all intents and purposes, made it impossible for institutions sharing power to bargain. Instead, we have institutions hording power. The result is dysfunction and an increasingly frustrated American public. Will that frustration lead to some grand swell up from the masses for political change? We can only hope, but that hope belies political realities.

Democrats face big challenges in 2012 here in Montana

A quick piece from Campaigns and Elections Magazine on the challenges Montana Democrats face here in 2012. Read it here.

One quick note: the piece says that Governor Schweitzer is up for reelection in 2012. That's not the case; Governor Schweitzer is term-limited, so the race is wide-open.

The Difference Between 1994 and 2010? Democrats Saw the Wave

An interesting piece on the 2010 midterms from MSNBC today on the debt Democrats took on to prevent even larger losses in the House. Some key points to consider:

In 1994, The Democrats were caught unawares when the GOP tidal wave hit. Now, because of the proliferation of polling, the Democrats not only knew they were in trouble, they had a good idea where and could shift resources appropriately. The same thing happened in 2006 when the Republicans lost their majority. In both cases, it seems the losses could have been much worse. Because of the ability to use polls to target with sophistication and partisan-motivated redistricting, large wave elections like '94 and '10 are much rarer today.

Second, the large debt combined with the loss of the House majority weakens considerable the Democrats going into the 2012 congressional election cycle. It's much hard to raise money when you aren't in the majority. Add to this the monumental drubbing the Democrats took in state gubernatorial and legislative races--which give the GOP a big leg up in redistricting, and forget about the Democrats winning back the House. Indeed, we'll probably see Republican gains in 2012.

Obama's stimulus passes...

without any GOP votes in the House.

Why?

Simple: the Republicans left in the House represent heavily Republican districts. Nearly every Republican representing a marginal House district lost in either 2006 or 2008.

Therefore, voting against the stimulus was the right vote. Voting for it can open up these House members to a primary challenge--virtually the only way they could lose their seats.

Expect more defections among Republicans in the Senate, given the nature of their more heterogenous constituencies.